Belgrade, Serbia - Photo: Nikola Aleksic
Serbia - Global Development
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Serbia’s president says he’ll resign within weeks after 18 months of mass protests over a deadly station collapse
Serbia entered a genuine political rupture in 2025-26. President Aleksandar Vučić, who has dominated Serbian politics for 14 years, announced on June 27, 2026 that he would resign within weeks, following 18 months of the largest anti-government protests in Serbia’s post-Milošević history. This article covers aid, tax, climate, and trade, the same four threads RYB tracks across every country page, against the backdrop of a crisis now inseparable from Serbia’s EU accession itself.
A Disaster That Became a Movement
On November 1, 2024, a recently renovated concrete canopy collapsed at the railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia’s second-largest city, killing 16 people. What began as grief over apparent corruption in a construction project became a sustained, student-led movement demanding accountability and snap elections, under the “bloody hand” stencil that became its emblem.
The scale has been extraordinary. At least 300,000 people gathered in Belgrade in March 2025; roughly 160,000 marked the disaster’s first anniversary in Novi Sad that November; a further 180,000 demonstrated in Belgrade in May 2026. Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned in January 2025 under the pressure. Vučić himself alternated between conciliatory gestures and confrontation, at one point in August 2025 denouncing protesters as “terrorists” attempting to bring down the state, before inviting student representatives to televised debate weeks later, an offer protesters rejected as a delaying tactic.
The resignation announcement itself, delivered to a rally of his own supporters in Belgrade, was notably vague: Vučić said he would remain president “for only a couple more weeks,” without specifying a date, while confirming early parliamentary and presidential elections would follow. His term was not otherwise due to expire until mid-2027. Analysts remain widely skeptical this marks a genuine political exit; commentators note Vučić could seek to return as prime minister, continuing a 14-year pattern in which power has followed him regardless of formal title.
EU Accession: A Process the Crisis Has Frozen
Serbia’s EU candidacy, granted in 2012, has moved only 22 of 35 negotiating chapters into formal opening, with just two provisionally closed, a pace that has stalled further amid the current crisis. The European Council on Foreign Relations has explicitly called on the EU to consider freezing Serbia’s accession negotiations entirely until the government returns to democratic fundamentals, while the European Parliament adopted a resolution by large majority urging Vučić to end repression of protesters and “be serious” about the accession path.
The government has consistently framed the unrest as a Brussels-directed pressure campaign aimed at forcing Serbia to align its foreign policy with the EU, particularly regarding Russia sanctions, a claim Vučić has repeated even as he affirms Serbia’s EU trajectory rhetorically. Public support for EU membership has itself declined as the crisis has dragged on, according to Serbian polling. Vučić has said he doubts Serbia would be admitted to the EU swiftly even if it fully joined Western sanctions on Russia, a notably candid acknowledgment of how distant genuine accession now looks.
Tax: Familiar Structural Weaknesses
Serbia’s tax system combines relatively low direct rates, 15% corporate tax and a flat 10% personal rate, with a heavier reliance on 20% VAT, a structure that shifts real burden toward consumption rather than income or capital. Collection efficiency remains a genuine constraint: Serbia’s grey economy is estimated at roughly 30% of GDP, undermining formal businesses that compete against untaxed informal operators.
Special economic zones offering tax holidays and customs exemptions have attracted foreign investment, but critics argue they create an uneven playing field favouring multinational assembly operations over domestic small businesses, some of which receive government subsidies exceeding €50,000 per job created, a figure that has drawn real scrutiny over whether this model builds sustainable economic foundations or simply subsidises low-wage manufacturing.
Climate and the Jadar Lithium Controversy
Serbia’s environmental story runs directly through the Rio Tinto Jadar project, one of Europe’s largest known lithium deposits, estimated capable of meeting up to 90% of German industry’s lithium demand. Environmental protests against the mine began in July 2024 and have continued as part of the wider anti-government movement, driven by fears over damage to the Jadar valley’s forests, farmland, and water resources.
In June 2025, the European Commission designated Jadar a “strategic project” under EU raw materials legislation, a decision that has deepened public distrust rather than resolved it. Investigative outlet BIRN revealed the German government has funded Jörg Heeskens, one of Vučić’s longest-serving advisers, who has helped clear the path for the project, at a reported cost of roughly €1.3 million between 2020 and 2026, a direct link between European industrial interests and the same governing system driving the protests in the first place.
Beyond Jadar, Serbia’s broader climate record remains weak: coal-fired power plants operate with inadequate emissions controls, urban air pollution ranks among Europe’s worst, and renewable energy development, despite genuine potential, continues to lag behind EU peers.
Trade: Balancing East and West Under Pressure
Serbia’s foreign policy balancing act between the EU, Russia, and China has come under direct strain during the crisis. Under pressure reportedly linked to Russia, Serbia introduced restrictions on arms exports in June 2025, and Vučić has continued emphasising Serbia’s military neutrality even while affirming EU aspirations rhetorically. Putin has publicly backed Vučić through the unrest, echoing the government’s own framing of the protests as a Western-orchestrated “colour revolution.”
Serbia’s Kosovo relations remain unresolved and continue to complicate its European trajectory: Vučić has reaffirmed Serbia will not recognise Kosovo’s independence, a position at odds with the 22 EU member states that have done so, and one the European Parliament’s own rapporteur has separately warned is fuelled by dangerous “Serbian World” nationalist rhetoric affecting the wider Balkans.
What Serbia Still Contributes
Serbia’s information technology sector has grown into a genuine regional strength, with Belgrade emerging as a tech hub attracting investment and skilled employment independent of the political crisis surrounding it. The student movement itself, whatever its ultimate political outcome, has demonstrated a level of sustained, organised civic engagement that few Western Balkan societies have shown in decades, a genuine democratic asset regardless of how the current standoff resolves.
How This Connects to the SDGs
The protest movement connects directly to SDG 16, peace, justice, and strong institutions, testing whether sustained civic pressure can achieve government accountability where formal checks and balances have failed. The Jadar lithium controversy ties SDG 13, climate action, and SDG 15, life on land, to a genuinely difficult trade-off: Europe’s own green transition depends on the critical minerals projects like Jadar would supply, set against the local environmental and community costs residents are actively resisting.
Stalled EU accession undermines SDG 17, global partnerships, at the structural level, while Serbia’s grey economy and VAT-heavy tax system limit the domestic resource mobilisation that goal is meant to encourage.
Looking Forward
Whether Vučić’s resignation announcement produces a genuine transfer of power, or becomes, as many analysts expect, a manoeuvre toward returning as prime minister while an ally holds the presidency, will be the clearest test of whether Serbia’s political crisis has actually been resolved or merely repackaged. The timing and conduct of the promised early elections deserve close attention.
The EU’s own response carries real weight: whether Brussels treats the accession process as inseparable from Serbia’s democratic backsliding, as the European Parliament’s resolution urges, or continues prioritising geopolitical convenience, will shape whether genuine reform pressure persists after the immediate crisis fades from headlines. RYB will track how Serbia’s elections unfold, whether the Jadar project proceeds despite continued opposition, and whether EU accession talks resume any real momentum. This page will be updated as new developments emerge.
Sources and References
- CNN, “Serbian President Vucic says he will resign within weeks amid student-led protests” — cnn.com
- Al Jazeera, “Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic says will resign within ‘weeks'” — aljazeera.com
- European Council on Foreign Relations, “After Novi Sad: How the EU can help Serbia resurrect its democratic path” — ecfr.eu
- European Parliament, “Anti-government protests in Serbia,” EPRS At a Glance — europarl.europa.eu
- OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, “Protests in Serbia: the government and its opponents close ranks” — osw.waw.pl
- EUToday, “Serbia protests turn Novi Sad tragedy into test for EU enlargement policy” — eutoday.net
- eunews, “Serbia, a year of student-led protests. No opening from Vučić, EU in big trouble” — eunews.it
- World Socialist Web Site, “Serbian President Vučić announces his resignation” — wsws.org
- Wikipedia, “2024 Serbian environmental protests” — en.wikipedia.org
- RYB, Official Development Assistance (ODA) — redyellowblue.org/finance/oda/
Serbia
Republic of Serbia
Republika Srbija
Srbija
Population
6,693,375 (2023 est.)
6,974,289 (2021)
7,012,165 (2020)
7,078,110 (2018)
note: does not include the population of Kosovo
Capital: Belgrade
Internet country code: .rs
Government
Official website: srbija.gov.rs
National tourist organisation: serbia.travel
Background
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was formed in 1918; its name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1929. Communist Partisans resisted the Axis occupation and division of Yugoslavia from 1941 to 1945 and fought nationalist opponents and collaborators as well. The military and political movement headed by Josip Broz “TITO” (Partisans) took full control of Yugoslavia when their domestic rivals and the occupiers were defeated in 1945. Although communists, TITO and his successors (Tito died in 1980) managed to steer their own path between the Warsaw Pact nations and the West for the next four and a half decades. In 1989, Slobodan MILOSEVIC became president of the Republic of Serbia and his ultranationalist calls for Serbian domination led to the violent breakup of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. In 1991, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia declared independence, followed by Bosnia in 1992. The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in April 1992 and under MILOSEVIC’s leadership, Serbia led various military campaigns to unite ethnic Serbs in neighboring republics into a “Greater Serbia.” These actions ultimately failed and, after international intervention, led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995.
MILOSEVIC retained control over Serbia and eventually became president of the FRY in 1997. In 1998, an ethnic Albanian insurgency in the formerly autonomous Serbian province of Kosovo provoked a Serbian counterinsurgency campaign that resulted in massacres and massive expulsions of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo. The MILOSEVIC government’s rejection of a proposed international settlement led to NATO’s bombing of Serbia in the spring of 1999. Serbian military and police forces withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999, and the UN Security Council authorized an interim UN administration and a NATO-led security force in Kosovo. FRY elections in late 2000 led to the ouster of MILOSEVIC and the installation of democratic government. In 2003, the FRY became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a loose federation of the two republics. Widespread violence predominantly targeting ethnic Serbs in Kosovo in March 2004 led to more intense calls to address Kosovo’s status, and the UN began facilitating status talks in 2006. In June 2006, Montenegro seceded from the federation and declared itself an independent nation. Serbia subsequently gave notice that it was the successor state to the union of Serbia and Montenegro.
In February 2008, after nearly two years of inconclusive negotiations, Kosovo declared itself independent of Serbia – an action Serbia refuses to recognize. At Serbia’s request, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in October 2008 sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was in accordance with international law. In a ruling considered unfavorable to Serbia, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion in July 2010 stating that international law did not prohibit declarations of independence. In late 2010, Serbia agreed to an EU-drafted UNGA Resolution acknowledging the ICJ’s decision and calling for a new round of talks between Serbia and Kosovo, this time on practical issues rather than Kosovo’s status. Serbia and Kosovo signed the first agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations between the two countries in April 2013 and are in the process of implementing its provisions. In 2015, Serbia and Kosovo reached four additional agreements within the EU-led Brussels Dialogue framework. These included agreements on the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities; telecommunications; energy production and distribution; and freedom of movement. President Aleksandar VUCIC has promoted an ambitious goal of Serbia joining the EU by 2025. Under his leadership as prime minister, in 2014 Serbia opened formal negotiations for accession.